Irma Martinez v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Irma Martinez v. Progressive Northwestern
Insurance Co. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Trent J. Waddoups; Carr and Waddoups; Counsel for Appellant.
Kristin A. VanOrman, James D. Franckowiak; Strong and Hanni; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Martinez v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co., No. 20040799 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5217






Defendant / Appellee. 
Appellate Case No. 20040799-CA 
District Court Civil No. 970905939 CV 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ANTHONY B. QUINN 
Trent J. Waddoups, Esq. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Kristin A. Van Orman (Bar No. 7333) 
James D. Franckowiak (Bar No. 9578) 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180. 
Attorneys for Appellee 









U T A H APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 23 2005 






Defendant / Appellee. 
Appellate Case No. 20040799-CA 
District Court Civil No. 970905939 CV 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ANTHONY B. QUINN 
Trent J. Waddoups, Esq. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kristin A. Van Orman (Bar No. 7333) 
James D. Franckowiak (Bar No. 9578) 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180. 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S 
UNTIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL 9 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When it 
Refused to Set Aside the Minute Entry 9 
B The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When it 
Refused to Enlarge the Time for Filing a Notice of 
Appeal 10 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 14 
III. UTAH LAW IS CLEAR: PIP BENEFIT COVERAGE IS GOVERNED BY THE 
"REASONABLE AND NECESSARY" STANDARD 18 
IV. THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL ATTORNEY FEES 
INCURRED ON APPEAL 24 
CONCLUSION 25 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. V. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 7 
Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989) 11 
Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 9 
Boren v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.. 637 N.W.2d 910 (Neb. App. 2002) 
19 
Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d, 622, (Utah 1985) 16 
Culbert v. Calderon. 17 Pa. P. & C.3d 499. 1980 WL 550 (Pa. Com. PL 1980) 19 
Elkins v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.. 583 A.2d 409, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) 
22 
Gallardo v. Bolinder. 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 1990) 8 
In re M.S.. 781 P.2d 1287, 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) 6 
In re T.D.C.. 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 8 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.. 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977) 20 
J.P.W. Enters. Inc. v. Naef. 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979) 9 
Labat v. Mallard Bay Drilling. Inc.. 806 So.2d 917, 923 (La. App. 2002) 19 
Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n. 457 N.W.2d 637, 645 (Mich. 1990) 22, 23, 24 
Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co.. 56 P.2d 524 (Utah 2002) 
15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 
iii 
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons. 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 9 
Rindahl v. National Farmers Union Insurance Co.. 373 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Minn. 1985) .. 
19, 22, 23 
Smyers v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. 157 Cal. App.3d 36, 203 Cal.Rptr. 521 
(1984) 19 
State v. Leatherburv. 65 P.3d 1180, 1182 (Utah 2003) 7 
Versluis v. Guaranty National Companies. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992) 20 
Walker v.Carlson. 740 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 9 
West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997) 11, 12, 13 
Statutes and Rules of Civil Procudure 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 19, 21, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(d) 14 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 6, 8, 10 
Rule 60(b) Utah R. Civ. Pro 9 
Other Authorities 
Utah Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106 17 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.5(a) 17 
iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(j). This 
case is before The Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to section 78-2-2(4)of the Utah Code 
Annotated. However, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal based on 
Appellant's untimely notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction over this matter based on Appellant's 
untimely notice of appeal. 
2. Was the trial court correct when it refused to set aside the minute entry 
dated, April 6, 2004? 
3. Was the trial court correct when it refused to enlarge the time for filing of 
Notice of Appeal? 
4. Did the trial court correctly determine that plaintiff was not entitled to 
attorney's fees? 
5. Did the trial court correctly determine that the "reasonable and necessary" 
standard is applicable to PIP benefit coverage? 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307 & Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 are set forth in an 
addendum to this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Progressive insured the plaintiff for a 1988 Cadillac Seville, for among other 
things, personal injury protection ('TIP") coverage. (R. 1-9). 
2. The plaintiff was involved in the first automobile accident on April 14, 1997 
with John Ray. (R. 1-9). 
3. The plaintiff incurred medical expenses as a result of the accident. (R. 1-9). 
4. The plaintiff was involved in a second automobile accident on June 8,1997 with 
Brandy Bunnel. (R. 1-9). 
5. On June 8, 1997, plaintiff had recovered 80% from her first accident. ( R. 
100). 
6. On June 24,1997, plaintiff told Progressive agents that she was not feeling any 
worse than she felt prior to the accident. ( R. 100). 
7. On June 24, 1997, plaintiffs husband spoke with James Szalay at Progressive 
and told him that the plaintiff sustained no injury whatsoever in the second collision and that 
he and the plaintiff did not wish to open up a new PIP claim file.( R. 103). 
8. In June, 1997, Progressive requested that Corvel, a medical management 
program that assists insureds in their return to work after an accident, conducted a medical 
review of the plaintiff in order to assist her in returning to work. ( R. 106). 
9. In connection with the medical review, Corvel requested copies of all medical 
records from plaintiffs medical providers. ( R. 106). 
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10. Some of plaintiff s medical providers did not give Corvel copies of their 
records. Accordingly, the medical review was unable to be conducted. (R. 106). 
11. Progressive paid all of the plaintiff s reasonable and necessary medical expenses 
up to the statutory limit, reasonable and necessary lost wages through June 20, 1997, and 
reasonable and necessary costs for household services through June 23, 1997. 
12. On August 19, 1997, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Progressive for a 
cause of action for breach of insurance contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and the tort of violation of public 
policy embodied in the No-Fault Insurance Act. (R. 1-9). 
13. Progressive filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking the Court to 
dismiss all of Plaintiff s claims except for that of breach of contract.( R. 127-46). 
14. Briefs were submitted on the matter and oral argument was heard. 
15. On November 6, 1998, the trial court signed an Order granting Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissed all of Plaintiff s claims except for that 
of breach of contract. (R. 265). 
16. On June 11,2003, the parties entered into stipulation that all claims, except for 
plaintiffs claims for attorney's fees, were settled and compromised and that plaintiffs claims 
against Progressive, except for the claims for attorney's fees, were dismissed with prejudice. 
(R. 638-39). 
17. After five months of plaintiff s counsel doing nothing, defense counsel filed 
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with a motion for determination of attorneys fees. (R. 640). 
18. In response to defendant's motion, plaintiffs counsel filed his affidavit and 
proposed order awarding over $72,000 in attorney fees for his pursuit of the $3000.00 PIP 
claim. (R. 648-62). 
19. On December 15,2003, the defendant filed an objection to plaintiffs proposed 
order because of the unreasonableness of fees being sought by plaintiffs counsel. (R. 679-
98). 
20. A hearing took place on January 12, 2004, wherein the court found that no 
attorney's fees were to be awarded. ( R. 703). 
21. On February 4, 2004, a final Order was entered denying plaintiffs request for 
attorney's fees. ( R. 716-19). 
22. On February 17, 2004, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, reverse, permit a 
new trial regarding attorney's fees. ( R. 720). 
23. On April 6, 2004, a Minute Entry was entered denying plaintiffs motion to 
reconsider. (R. 766). 
24. On May 7, 2004, 31 days after the Minute Entry was signed, the plaintiff filed 
her Notice of Appeal. (R. 767). 
25. On June 4, 2004, plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment; or Rule 
60(b) Motion to Set Aside; or Rule 4(e) Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal. 
26. On June 17, 2004, The Utah Court of Appeals filed their Memorandum 
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Decision dismissing plaintiffs untimely appeal. (R. 827-28). 
27. On August 16, 2004, plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Final Judgment; or Rule 
60(b) Motion to Set Aside; or Rule 4(e) Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal was denied. 
(R. 834). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's rulings were consistent and correct. First, the trial court was 
correct in holding that plaintiffs affidavit for attorney's fees totaling $72,885.00 was 
clearly unreasonable and incredulous when viewed in light of the actions taken in pursuit 
of the breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs counsel was advised of the burden to allocate 
for his time as it related specifically to the pursuit of the breach of contract claim and he 
failed to do so. 
Second, the Utah Court of Appeals correctly held that plaintiff did not file her 
Notice of Appeal timely. 
Third, the trial court correctly held that plaintiffs counsel did not properly 
demonstrate any excusable neglect for his failure to file the Notice of Appeal timely and 
properly denied plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion. The trial court was also correct in denying 
plaintiffs Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Notice of Appeal as the burden was on 
plaintiffs counsel to check with the court, as often as necessary, as to the date of entry of 
judgment in order to ensure that the notice of appeal would be timely filed. 
Finally, the trial court was correct in reaffirming Utah case law by applying the 
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"reasonable and necessary" standard for the payment of PIP benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION BASED UPON 
PLAINTIFF'S UNTIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
This Court must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on an untimely notice 
of appeal. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the time limit in which 
an appeal must be filed. That Rule states, in pertinent part: 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from 
the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required 
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The district court entered a final judgment denying plaintiff s request for attorneys fees 
on February 4,2004. (R. 716-19). Pursuant to Rule 59, plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion 
seeking reconsideration and/or recusal of Judge Quinn. (R. 720-41). The Order denying 
plaintiffs Rule 59 motion was entered on April 6, 2004. (R. 766). Plaintiff filed her Notice 
of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court on May 7, 2004. (R. 767-68). Because the notice of 
appeal was filed 31 days after entry of the Order denying plaintiff s rule 59 motion, plaintiffs 
notice of appeal is untimely and should be stricken. Accordingly, this Court is "bound by the 
filing date indicated on the notice of appeal transmitted to it by the trial court." In re M.S., 
781 P.2d 1287, 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam). 
It is undisputed that the February 4,2004, order was the final order as it stated the issue 
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regarding attorney fees was the only remaining matter in this case and the case was to be 
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. The Order expressly provided, in relevant part: 
Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby ORDERS, 
ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that plaintiff is to be awarded no 
attorney's fees in this matter. Because this was the only 
remaining issue in this matter, this Court hereby also orders that 
this case is hereby dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. 
(R. 716-19). 
Plaintiffs counsel appealed the district court's final order. The district court once more 
denied plaintiff s post-judgment motion seeking recusal and reconsideration on April 6,2004. 
The court's language was unambiguous. The district court ordered: 
Plaintiffs motion to reconsider is denied. The motion does not 
address the problems with Plaintiffs initial appliceition. Plaintiff 
has completely failed in its burden to produce credible evidence 
from which an award of a reasonable attorneys fee can be 
fashioned. 
(R. 766). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that in similar situations, any signed minute 
entry shall constitute a final order unless there is substance or language in the order which 
indicates that it is not intended as final. Further, where no further action is contemplated by 
the express language of the minute order, it is a final determination susceptible to 
enforcement. State v. Leatherburv. 65 P.3d 1180, 1182 (Utah 2003). The Utah Court of 
Appeals held in similar circumstances that generally an order denying relief regarding a prior 
final order constitutes a final order in itself. See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. V. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
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950 (Utah Ct App. 1989). 
Plaintiffs counsel claimed that a reasonable attorney would not understand that the 
denial of his motion to reconsider left the underlying final order intact, or that there was no 
final order related to his post-judgment motion. However, the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah Court of Appeal's case law is clear. The district court's orders comport with such case 
law. There was an original final order which stated that it disposed of all remaining issues in 
the case. Once plaintiffs post-judgment motion was denied, as of that day, a final order had 
been entered in this case. Utah Courts hold that where the trial court has signed an order 
which states that it disposes of all remaining issues, such order is a final order. InreT.D.C, 
748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Gallardo v. Bolinder. 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 1990). 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that when faced with a 
post-judgment order regarding a post-judgment motion, "the time for appeal for all parties 
shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion." The time for appeal shall remain 30 days after the filing of such order. Rule 4(b) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Based on Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff had 30 days to 
file a timely notice of appeal. Plaintiffs right to file a Notice of Appeal expired on May 6, 
2004. It is undisputed however, that plaintiff instead filed her Notice of Appeal on May 7, 
2004. Such Notice is untimely and does not comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Therefore, under Rule 4(b), plaintiffs right to appeal expired on May 6, 2004. Because the 
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district court had denied plaintiff s motion to reconsider a "final j udgment", there was no need 
for the district court to enter another "final judgment" in this matter. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
REFUSED TO SET ASIDE THE MINUTE ENTRY. 
The district court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief under 
Rule 60(b) and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. 
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may excuse 
a party or his legal representative from compliance with a final judgment or order for: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) new evidence; (3) fraud; (4) void 
judgments; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, discharged, or released, or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief. See Rule 60(b) Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
In determining whether to grant such motion, the trial court must review the underlying 
facts of the matter and determine whether relief for mistake or excusable neglect is warranted. 
Walker v.Carlson, 740P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons. 
817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In making such determination, courts are to consider the 
type of hardship placed on a litigant, for example if such non-compliance results in a default 
judgment. J.P.W. Enters. Inc. v. Naef. 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979). There is no case law which 
suggests that the denial of a plaintiff s attorney's outlandish attorney fees constitutes the same 
type of hardship experienced by the entry of a default judgment against a party to the suit. 
In the present matter, plaintiffs counsel did not properly demonstrate any excusable 
9 
neglect. He merely provided an affidavit that once he realized the 30 days to file a notice of 
appeal had nearly expired, he called this Court once to find out whether the minute order was 
final. (See R. 780-81). He also states that his assistant made a similar phone call which was 
never returned. (See R.783-84). 
Even assuming the truth of such statements, blaming this Court for his failure to 
comply with the provisions in Rule 4(b) does not constitute excusable neglect. Further Rule 
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly states that "the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any 
other [post-judgment] order." Rule 4(b) Utah R. App. Pro. 
It is clear that plaintiff s counsel filed a post-judgment motion regarding the final order 
which denied his attorney fees. Such order was denied on April 6,2004. A reasonable attorney 
(especially one who charges $500 an hour) would have known that he or she had "30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order denying his post-judgment motion." Plaintiffs 
counsel has failed to demonstrate any excusable neglect. In fact, plaintiffs counsel has 
succeeded only in placing the blame for such delinquency on everyone but himself. As such, 
the trial court was correct when it denied plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
REFUSED TO ENLARGE THE TIME FOR FILING A NOTICE OF 
APPEAL. 
Plaintiffs counsel argues that the 30 day time limit should be extended because he 
calendared the date wrong, he did not know whether the order would be viewed as final, the 
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court clerk never called back regarding whether the minute entry would be viewed as final, 
and plaintiffs counsel had a busy schedule. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 5-9). However, Utah's 
rules "put the burden on counsel to check periodically with the clerk of the court as to the date 
of entry [of judgment]." Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech. Inc., 780 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1989). 
In Automatic Control Prods. Corp., the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs time should have been extended based on her 
argument that she was lulled into a false belief that the court would take an extended amount 
of time in deciding the decision based on past decisions. The court placed the burden on the 
attorney to check periodically with the court to determine whether an order has been signed. 
In that case and others following its holding, the supreme court has refused to place any 
responsibility on the courts to notify counsel regarding decisions. Moreover, the court noted 
that Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment shall be 
promptly served by a party preparing it. However, the rule also states that "[t]he time for filing 
a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this provision." This rule was in effect 
at all times material to the instant case. The purpose of this rule is to maintain the burden of 
discovering the outcome of a court's decision on those interested in the decision. Utah law 
clearly provides that interested parties, not the court, has the burden of discovering the 
outcome of matters placed before the court. 
In West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court 
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held that in the absence of other evidence supporting a finding of excusable neglect, a court 
clerk's failure to send notice cannot act as a basis for finding excusable neglect in order to 
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
In West, the plaintiff brought an action against Grand County in federal court and in 
state court. The county moved for and was granted summary judgment on the state court 
claims. The court subsequently considered two post-judgment motions. The first filed by the 
plaintiff was a motion to amend the judgment. The second motion, filed by the county, was 
a motion to strike the affidavits accompanying the plaintiffs motion to amend. On April 13, 
1995, the court signed orders denying the plaintiffs motion and granting the county's motion. 
The plaintiff learned of the entry of the orders in June 1995, after the 30 day period for filing 
appeals had run. 
Plaintiff then filed for an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal based on 
her failure to receive notice from the clerk that the orders had been signed by the judge, on 
the county's failure to send the court extra mailing copies as required under the rules of civil 
in effect at the time, and upon her own excusable neglect for failing to periodically check with 
the clerk to verify whether an order had been entered. The court granted the plaintiffs 
extension without allowing the county to file an opposition to the motion. The plaintiff 
continued her appeal and the county then moved for summary disposition on the plaintiffs 
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court denied the county's motion but remanded the case to the 
district court for determination of whether the court had considered the county's opposition 
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to the plaintiffs motion for extension of time. On remand, the district court denied the 
plaintiffs motion for extension and the supreme court was asked to review the decision. 
At the time the case was decided, Rule 77(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
stated that "[ljack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or 
relieve the party for failure to appeal within the time allowed." Id, at 340. The court held 
that, based on the language of Rule 77, the court could not find excusable neglect based solely 
on a court clerk's failure to mail notice. With regard to the plaintiffs failure to check 
periodically with the clerk to determine whether the order had been signed, the court stated 
that the plaintiffs failure to check was neglect. 
In this case, the district court entered its judgment against Martinez on February 4, 
2004. (R. 716-19). The plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion seeking reconsideration and/or 
recusal of Judge Quinn, which was denied on April 6, 2004. (R. 766). Plaintiff filed her 
Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court on May 7, 2004. (R. 767-68). Martinez's time 
for filing her notice of appeal was not affected by the numerous excuses offered by plaintiffs 
counsel. The burden was on plaintiffs counsel to check with the court, as often as necessary, 
as to the date of entry of judgment in order to ensure that the notice of appeal would be timely 
filed. The burden was on plaintiffs counsel to calendar the day correctly. The burden was on 
plaintiffs counsel to "un-busy" his schedule to make more than one phone call to the court. 
The time period to file Martinez's Notice of Appeal expired on May 6, 2004. As such, any 
argument by Martinez regarding the trial court's or the court's clerk's failure to provide notice 
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is irrelevant and should be disregarded. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE COUNSEL'S 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE NOT REASONABLE. 
The Utah No-Fault statute provides that a person entitled to PIP benefits: 
... may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses plus 
the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to 
pay any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required 
to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
UCA31A-22-309)(5)(d). 
In the present case, Progressive voluntarily paid the applicable PIP benefits to the 
claimant. However, because the claimant brought a cause of action for breach of contract, the 
court ordered that a "reasonable" attorney's fee be paid. Plaintiffs counsel submitted an 
affidavit for attorney's fees totaling $72,885.00. Such an amount is clearly unreasonable, and 
is in fact, incredulous, viewed in light of the actions taken in pursuit of the breach of contract 
claim. Little action was taken by the plaintiff to pursue payments of the PIP benefits beyond 
the filing of the original Complaint. The many hours detailed in plaintiffs affidavit for 
attorneys fees include hours spent pursuing plaintiffs claims for bad faith and violation of the 
tort of public policy, as well as plaintiffs attempts to turn this matter into a class action, all 
which have failed. In fact, the breach of contract claim was but a minimal part of the 
Complaint filed by the plaintiff. Instead, the majority of the Complaint set forth allegations 
of bad faith, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and numerous other causes of action which were 
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promptly dismissed by the Court. Because little work was done to pursue the breach of 
contract claim, attorney fees should be limited in this matter. 
The issue of attorney fees in the PIP context has been dealt with by the Third District 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court in an identical case to the present. This matter is identical 
in every way to the case of Prince v. Bear River, 56 P.3d 524 (Utah 2002) which involved the 
identical issues, claims, pleadings and counsel. In that case, Mr. Waddoups filed the identical 
briefs verbatim as were filed in this case, and, like this case, attempted a failed effort to turn 
the matter into a class action. In that case, a motion was made for determination of attorney 
fees, and Mr. Waddoups submitted an affidavit for over $22,000 in fees (R. 688-98) In fact, 
on careful inspection of the fee affidavit submitted in that case, 15 of the time/date entries 
submitted by Mr. Waddoups are identical to the time/date entries submitted in this case, (see 
R.648-62; 688-98) The only difference between the two is that in the Prince case, Mr. 
Waddoups charged $250.00 for his time and in this case, he is attempting to charge $500.00 
for his time. In the Prince case, the efforts of counsel in pursuit of PIP benefits were a mirror 
image to what transpired in this case. In that matter, the trial court awarded counsel $450.00 
in attorneys fees. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling 
regarding the attorney fee award. The Court upheld the trial court's ruling, noting that the 
plaintiff was "not entitled to all the attorney fees he incurred pursuing this suit because he 
prevailed only on the contract claim... Therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding $450 in attorney fees" IcL at 56, 57. 
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In the present case, a similar type of award is necessary. Counsel's actions were 
identical to those taken in the Prince case. In fact, an argument can be made that such fees 
should even be less as the brunt of the research and work had already been performed and 
billed in the Prince case, and the only actions that were undertaken in this matter by counsel 
consisted of little more than "cutting and pasting" the pleadings. Counsel has attempted to 
double bill many of the exact time entries that were submitted in the Prince case, which were 
denied by the Utah Supreme Court. However, counsel failed in his attempt to collect 
thousands of dollars in the Prince case, and is therefore seeking a second chance in this case. 
Such a tactic is not warranted and should not be justified by this Court. The plaintiff did 
nothing to pursue his cause of action for breach of contract in the underlying case. Other than 
filing the original complaint, there was no discovery, motions, memoranda, or arguments 
presented to the trial court regarding the breach of contract claim. Because Progressive paid 
the full PIP limit, such attorney's fees could never have arisen in the underlying case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "reasonable" attorney's fees are not measured 
by what an attorney actually bills, nor is the number of hours spent on the case determinative 
in computing fees. Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d, 622, (Utah 1985). The Supreme Court has 
provided guidance to trial courts when determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees. The 
Supreme Court has recommended that a trial judge may take into account the provision in the 
code of professional responsibility which specifies the elements that should be considered in 
setting reasonable attorney's fees. 
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Utah Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106 provides that a court may 
consider, among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys 
in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the case and 
the result attained and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. (Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 1.5(a)). 
Applying the standards set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct, it is clear that 
counsel's request for attorney's fees is unreasonable. This matter involved a simple request 
for payment of PIP expenses. The lawsuit was filed, and thereafter Progressive paid the full 
amount of PIP benefits available under the policy. Although the PIP benefits were not paid 
for a number of years, the time that lapsed consisted of the plaintiff pursuing failed claims 
unrelated to the breach of contract as well as years of virtual inactivity in the case. 
It is apparent from counsel's affidavit he is attempting to collect attorney's fees for 
amounts billed in connection with numerous hours of research and preparation of memoranda 
regarding his arguments dealing with the "reasonable and necessary" standard in this case, as 
well as other attempts to turn this matter into a class action, etc. Such arguments were futile 
and were promptly dismissed by the Court. As such, attorney fees are not available for the 
time spent pursuing these meritless claims. 
Counsel's affidavit also sets forth his hourly rate for services rendered. Counsel 
represents that prior to 1997, his rate was $150 per hour; and thereafter, more than tripled to 
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$500 per hour. Defendant would submit that such rates are extremely high and are not 
comparable to those customarily charged in Utah for simple cases such as the recovery of PIP 
benefits. In 1997, Plaintiffs counsel had only been out of law school for one to two years and 
was in no way entitled to command such premium rates. 
In the Prince case, plaintiffs counsel was advised of the burden to allocate for his time 
as it related specifically to the pursuit of the breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs counsel 
failed to make any sort of allocation of time and fees spent on preparing the complaint for the 
recovery of PIP expenses as well as work on interrogatory responses. Instead, plaintiffs 
counsel is trying to pass off the entire "alleged" cost of the litigation. Because the issues in 
this case are neither novel nor complex and because plaintiffs counsel failed his burden in 
allocating fees for the breach of contract claim, the district court did not err when it held that 
plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees. 
III. UTAH LAW IS CLEAR: PIP BENEFIT COVERAGE IS GOVERNED BY THE 
"REASONABLE AND NECESSARY" STANDARD. 
Plaintiff asks this Court to create an interpretation of the Utah No-Fault statute which 
contradicts Utah precedent. Plaintiffs interpretation would require insurance companies to 
pay for all incurred expenses within the $3,000 statutory limit regardless of the reasonableness 
or necessity of those payments. Plaintiff is unable to cite any legal precedent to support the 
proposition that the reasonableness or necessity of No-Fault payments should not be 
considered in determining PIP benefits. However, without a "reasonable and necessary" 
standard, plaintiffs proposal would provide an automatic reward or "windfall" for being 
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involved in any accident- even when no loss was actually suffered. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently held that a "reasonable and necessary" standard 
should be used when determining PIP benefit payments. Prince v. Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Co.. 56 P.2d 524 (Utah 2002). Further, the "reasonable and necessary" standard 
is a broadly recognized standard for the payment of PIP benefits, not only in Utah, but 
throughout the United States. See Rindahl v. National Farmers Union Insurance Co., 373 
N.W.2d 294, 296 (Minn. 1985) (household service benefits provided by insurer when 
reasonably incurred); Culbert v. Calderon, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 499, 1980 WL 550 (Pa. Com. 
PI. 1980) (Pennsylvania court finding expert testimony admissible on the reasonableness of 
household service in PIP claims); Smyers v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 157 Cal. 
App.3d 36,203 Cal.Rptr. 521 (1984) (household services should be medically necessary and 
reasonable); Labat v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 806 So.2d 917, 923 (La. App. 
2002)(reasonable standard applied when determining household services expenses). Boren 
v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 637N.W.2d910 (Neb. App. 2002)(damages 
allowed for reasonable household services). 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 sets forth the "reasonable and necessary" standard in 
the context of PIP coverage: 
(1) Personal Injury Protection coverages and benefits include: (a) 
the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, 
surgical, x-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic 
devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed 
a total of $3,000 per person...(ii) a special damage allowance not 
exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days, for services 
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actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred, for services 
that, but for the injury, the injured person would have performed 
for his household, (emphasis added). 
The plain language of the statute requires a "reasonable" standard. Without the 
"reasonable and necessary" standard, insurance companies would be forced to pay claimants 
the $3,000 statutory limit regardless of whether such expenses were legitimate. This standard, 
proposed by plaintiff, conflicts with the long held tenant that the Utah No-Fault Act: 
both in its statement of general purpose, and its specific 
provisions, was not intended to provide automatic reward or 
a 'windfall' for being involved in an accident by requiring 
payment when there was no loss actually suffered, nor for any 
expense no reasonably to be incurred. 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977); Versluis v. Guaranty National 
Companies. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed plaintiffs counsel's same argument that 
a "reasonable and necessary" standard did not apply to PIP benefits with respect to medical 
benefits. In Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co.. 56 P.3d 524 (Utah 2002), the Utah 
Supreme Court determined PIP benefits should be considered in light of the reasonableness 
or necessity of medical payments. 
In Prince, the plaintiff sued to collect PIP benefits under an insurance policy for alleged 
injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Id. The plaintiff underwent a medical examination 
to "investigate the necessity of Prince's medical expenses." Id. The medical examination 
revealed that plaintiffs chiropractic care was merely "palliative," because it did not provide 
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any legitimate corrective care. Id. 
Based on the medical examiner's findings, a Bear River claims adjustor determined 
that prolonged chiropractic care was neither reasonable nor necessary and discontinued 
payment for future chiropractic visits. Id. Plaintiff sued Bear River claiming that the 
insurance company was obligated to pay up to $3,000 in PIP benefits because it did not matter 
if such treatment was "reasonable or necessary." Id. at 530. 
Defendant Bear River presented evidence that the "reasonable and necessary" standard 
was a recognized standard in the insurance industry. Further, the Utah No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance Act included the "reasonable and necessary" standard within the statute. Id. at 531. 
The Utah Supreme Court inspected the Utah No-Fault act set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307(l)(a) and found that PIP benefits were intended to cover out-of-pocket 
expenses incurred for necessary expenses. Id. at 531. The Court agreed with prior Utah case 
law which stated that: 
PIP benefits were not intended 'to provide an automatic reward 
or 'windfall' for being involved in an accident by requiring 
payment when there was no loss actually suffered...[Further] a 
PIP insurer can deny coverage if no loss was actually suffered or 
if the expenses incurred were outside the scope of coverage. 
Id. 
Based on this language, the Utah Supreme Court found that some standard of 
reasonableness or necessity must exist with respect to PIP payments in order to avoid an 
automatic windfall for unnecessary PIP expenses. Id. The Court pointed out that section (a) 
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of the Utah No-Fault Act provides: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, 
surgical, x-ray,...hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a 
total of $3,000 per person. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
307(1 )(a)(emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court held that "under the plain language of the relevant 
statute...Bear River was required to pay PIP benefits to cover only expenses for necessary 
medical treatments." Id. The Court further supported this finding by citing case law from other 
jurisdictions which hold that No-Fault insurance payments must not be made unless 
"reasonably necessary." Id. at 533; See also Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 457 N. W.2d 637, 
645 (Mich. 1990); Elkins v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.. 583 A.2d 409, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1990). Finally, the Utah Supreme Court ended its discussion of the "reasonable and 
necessary" standard by holding that if Prince incurred unnecessary PIP expenses, "then Bear 
River was not required to pay PIP benefits to cover those expenses." Id. 
Other jurisdictions hold that No-Fault insurance payments for household services must 
be reasonable and necessary. See Rindahl v. National Farmers Union Insurance Co., 373 
N.W.2d 294, 296 (Minn. 1985). In Rindahl the plaintiff was injured in a car accident and 
sued to collect household benefits under the Minnesota No-Fault statute. She claimed that 
although she had a full-time job outside the home, she was entitled to replacement service loss 
benefits for the reasonable value of her household services under the No-Fault Act. The court 
found that because she did some work in the household, she was entitled only to a reasonable 
and necessary amount of the statutory limit, rather than automatically receiving the statutory 
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benefits. Id. at 296. 
The court held that No-Fault benefits cover only the reasonable value of household 
services and that "service loss benefits shall reimburse all expenses reasonably incurred by 
or on behalf of the non-fatally injured person in obtaining usual and necessary substitute 
services." Id. at 296 (emphasis added) . Further, "benefits] to be provided under this 
subdivision shall be the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining usual and necessary 
substitute care and maintenance of the home." Id. (emphasis added). 
In yet another jurisdiction, the New Jersey Superior Court found that No-Fault benefits 
are to be "construed to effect the prompt and efficient payment of benefits for victims of auto 
accidents." Id. at 700. However, the court further went on to hold that "notwithstanding this 
requirement, however, in order to be compensable such medical expenses must be both 
reasonable and necessary'." Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Assoc, 457 N.W.2d 637 (Mich. 1990), the court 
discussed the "reasonable and necessary" standard under the Michigan No-Fault Act. The 
court determined that under that act "an insurer is not liable for any medical expense to the 
extent that it is not a reasonable charge for a particular product or service, or if the product 
or service itself is not reasonably necessary'' Id. at 645. (emphasis added). 
Based on Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co., it is clear that under the Utah No-
Fault Statute PIP benefits cover only reasonable and necessary expenses. Further, courts agree 
that PIP benefits do not extend to unreasonable and unnecessary charges "for a particular 
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product or service." Nasser, 457 N.W.2d at 645. 
The household service benefit is a service governed by the same reasonable and 
necessary standard as chiropractic services in Prince. Case law, and the plain language of the 
statute, supports this assertion. It would be a flawed and inconsistent interpretation of the No-
Fault Act to provide an automatic payment for some PIP services and not others. The Utah 
Supreme Court found "PIP benefits were not intended 'to provide an automatic reward or 
'windfall' for being involved in an accident by requiring payment when there was no loss 
actually suffered." Id. at 531. If household services were paid when no loss was actually 
suffered and without some consideration of their reasonableness or necessity insureds would 
receive this very windfall. 
IV. THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES 
INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
Progressive recognizes that attorney' s fees are available on appeal. However, such fees 
are not warranted for the plaintiff in this case. Instead, it is the defendant who is justified in 
asking for fees. 
Plaintiffs appeal is meritless. As such, Progressive should be awarded the attorney's 
fees that have been generated in having to defend such a frivolous appeal. The plaintiff has 
had several bites at the apple to argue his meritless position at the trial court level and every 
time, the plaintiff was defeated. In fact, Progressive has prevailed on every issue presented 
to the trial court. The plaintiff had no basis in law or fact for bringing his claims for bad faith, 
breach of contract, fraud, infliction of emotional distress, etc. against Progressive. 
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Furthermore, plaintiff has no basis for bringing an appeal where the Notice of Appeal was 
filed after the statutory deadline. The plaintiff has attempted to create new law in this case, 
and by doing so, has ignored the existing case law, statutory provisions and contract language 
that govern. This Court should not reward the plaintiff for such conduct through an award of 
attorney's fees. Instead, such conduct should be deterred, and Progressive should be 
compensated for having to defend this matter once again. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held that plaintiffs counsel did not properly demonstrate any 
excusable neglect for his failure to file the Notice of Appeal timely and properly denied 
plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion. The trial court was also correct in denying plaintiffs Motion 
for Enlargement of Time to File Notice of Appeal as the burden was on plaintiffs counsel to 
check with the court, as often as necessary, as to the date of entry of judgment in order to 
ensure that the notice of appeal would be timely filed. 
The trial court also properly held that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees 
where the plaintiffs affidavit for attorney's fees totaled $72,885.00 and were clearly 
unreasonable and incredulous when viewed in light of the actions taken in pursuit of the 
breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs counsel was advised of the burden to allocate for his time 
as it related specifically to the pursuit of the breach of contract claim and he failed to do so. 
As such, only attorney's fees generated in the pursuit of PIP payment were justified. Because 
the only actions taken to pursue the payment of PIP benefits was the filing of the portion of 
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the Complaint dealing with the breach of contract action, the trial court's award of $450.00 
in attorney's fees was reasonable. 
The trial court in the underlying case was just, reasonable and correct in all of its 
rulings. As such, Progressive respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's 
rulings denying plaintiffs motion to reconsider, enlargement of time, and awarding the 
plaintiff attorney's fees. Progressive would also ask that this Court deny plaintiffs request 
for attorney's fees on appeal, and instead, award Progressive its attorney's fees in having to 
defend this meritless appeal. 
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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